Thoughts from the Frontline

Unintended Consequences

March 3, 2012

Choose your language

"Illusions commend themselves to us because they save us pain and allow us to enjoy pleasure instead. We must therefore accept it without complaint when they sometimes collide with a bit of reality against which they are dashed to pieces."

– Sigmund Freud

Let me introduce Mauldin's Rule of Thumb Concerning Unintended Consequences:

For every government law hurriedly passed in response to a current or recent crisis, there will be two or more unintended consequences, which will have equal or greater negative effects then the problem it was designed to fix. A corollary is that unelected institutions are at least as bad and possibly worse than elected governments. A further corollary is that laws passed to appease a particular group, whether voters or a particular industry, will have at least three unintended consequences, most of which will eventually have the opposite effect than the intended outcomes and transfer costs to innocent bystanders.

This week we wonder about the consequences of the European Central Bank (ECB) issuing over €1 trillion in short-term loans to try and postpone a banking credit crisis and lower sovereign debt costs for certain peripheral countries in Europe. What if, instead of holding the European Monetary Union (EMU or Eurozone) together, that actually makes a breakup more likely? That would certainly fall under the rubric of unintended consequences, and be worth our time to contemplate in this week's letter.

Further, what if the group that oversees credit default swaps declares an actual sovereign debt default not to be a technical default in order to avoid a credit crisis because CDSs would have to be paid? Could that actually undermine the ability of smaller countries to borrow money at lower cost, if they could even borrow it at all? Thus making the eventual outcome even worse? We will explore these perplexing questions and more as we once again turn our attention to Europe.

But first, and quickly, we are now ready to take reservations for the 9th Annual Strategic Investment Conference, May 2-4, which this year will be in Carlsbad, California for the first time, at a venue that will allow us to take a few more attendees but still keep that intimate feeling. I host the conference, along with my partner Jon Sundt and his team at Altegris Investments.

Each year I wonder how we could make the conference any better, but I think we have done it. I must say that I do not think any conference anywhere has the quality speaking line-up that we do. It is the finest collection of top-notch raconteurs posing as economists assembled anywhere. Each speaker is a headliner in his own right, wherever they go. We have nothing but the best each year.

Look at this line-up: Dr. Woody Brock, Mohamed El-Erian, Marc Faber, Niall Ferguson, Jeff Gundlach, David Harding, Dr. Lacy Hunt, Paul McCulley, David McWilliams (from Ireland), David Rosenberg, Jon Sundt, and your humble analyst. Plus the surprise guests. Seriously, where else can you find all that talent under one roof? I design the conference each year to be the one that I would want to attend. And Sundt and team run as smooth and enjoyable a conference as you will find anywhere.

Signing up will also give you access to exclusive papers and webinars. For example, next week I'll be interviewing Winton Capital Management. For regulatory reasons, you will need to speak with Altegris to verify your accredited-investor status, prior to being allowed to attend. You can learn more and register by going to http://meetings.StrategicInvestmentConference.

I should note that the best feature of the conference is the attendees themselves. You will make new friends and meet old ones. And the speakers are very accessible. The price goes up considerably on March 15, so register early. We always sell out, and I get calls asking to get in at the last minute, and have no way to help. Don't procrastinate. Register now. We are way ahead of last year on the pace of registrations. Again, it will sell out. Do it now.

Unintended Consequences

The ECB injected (created? printed?) €529.5 billion for an annual cost of 1%, more than the €489 billion they issued just last December. This was called a long-term refinancing operation, or LTRO. The total now is over €1 trillion euros (around $1.3 trillion), which can only make Ben Bernanke jealous. That money was technically issued to the various national central banks, who in turn lent it to their various commercial banks for…

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Comments

John Mauldin

March 5, 2012, 2:20 p.m.

Rob,

I am in essential agreement with you, as I almost always am. I find you one of the most thoughtful thinkers I know.

What I suggest is that, given the political realities, the needed private investment will take longer than it should. Thus a drop in government spending will have a short-term (one year, if the academics are right) effect on GDP.

That political difficulty is the problem. Which is why I favor a radical restructuring of the tax code to be more growth-oriented.

The issue once again is that the reigning thought paradigm is Keynesian, which is one of those things that work in theory but not in practice. Further, adopting it becomes self-fulfilling, i.e., cutting spending while not making private investment easier does in fact produce the slower economy they predict, but because they would only use half of your prescription. Maddening.

And while Harding did slash spending, in terms of GDP I donâ??t think it was all that much. We had a much smaller government sector then. And lower tax rates. If we even went back to how it was pre-Harding, it would be a huge boost to us now. Which only shows how bad it has become.

Should we open up the entire area of the US (coast, oceans, Alaska, etc.) to drilling? Lower corporate taxes dramatically and get the government out of providing subsidies? Sure, and a score of other things.

The serious issues that are different now are the tidal shifts in age and technology that are going on, which render much of the education we have enshrined as pointless. We have told our kids to get a college degree that transfers no marketable skills but becomes a tool of discrimination to get a lower-paying job that does not need said degree. Thank God you and I donâ??t have to rely on our degrees to make money.

Robert Arnott

March 5, 2012, 2:15 p.m.

I think youâ??re off-target on the consequences of austerity.  Austerity doesnâ??t necessarily mean falling GDP.  But, Europe is doing its best to â??proveâ? a linkage that need not be.  If GDP = government spending + consumer spending + capital spending (investments) + net exports, then slashing government spending means slashing GDP, *unless* that reduced spending is offset elsewhere.  If government prevents the private sector from functioning sensibly, thereâ??s no offset and austerity creates recession.  Thatâ??s whatâ??s happening in Europe (and the US and Japan, for that matter).

Suppose government spending is slashed and the private sector can pick up the slack.  Imagine if Greece, Spain, France, Portugal and Italy, to name just a few of the worst offenders, deregulated and allowed the private sector to blossom.  Companies could hire and fire at will (gosh, what might that do for the work ethic), at a market-clearing price for those who want entry-level jobs (unemployment â?¦ what unemployment?).  The 50% youth unemployment in Spain drops to single digits.  Redistribution of wealth, sure, but only sufficient to prevent abject poverty.  Dismantle regulatory impediments that double the cost of operating a business, while enforcing the laws that prevent illegal and unethical conduct.  Eliminate all tariffs, to reduce the cost of imports to all citizens, rather than protecting a few jobs that are â?? by definition â?? no longer competitive in a global economy.

This is what happened after WW II, and in the 1920-21 depression.  The two examples are instructive.

After WW II, government spending plunged from 44% to 12% of GDP in two years (the fall in the red line below).  There were two short, sharp recessions in 1946 and 1949, by which time the private sector had picked up the slack (the turquoise dashed line).  Private sector GDP soared by over 80% between 1944 and 1951.  The recessions cost the democrats 56 House seats and 13 Senate seats in 1946, losing them both houses of Congress; the pace of the recovery in the private sector regained 75 House seats and 9 Senate seats in 1948, just two years later.

In the 1920-21 depression, GDP and prices fell faster than in the Great Depression, but the depression lasted only 18 months.  Harding came into office with the Depression well under way.  He slashed government spending, vowing that â??we mean to have less of government in business, and more business in government.â?  This president, whom history has treated with little respect, arguably ignited the roaring 20s.  Hoover and then Roosevelt sought to assure that the Harding dictum was reversed.

When the public sector is slashed, the private sector generally blossoms.  See the second and third graphs.  Because this happens with a lag, people fear austerity.  But, it doesnâ??t take long for the private sector to kick in.  Instead of a mythical Keynesian Multiplier, which countless empirical studies have (at best) failed to lend support or discredited outright, letâ??s look at the â??public/private multiplier.â?  For each 1% increase in government outlays, how much does the private sector contract?  Empirically, this multiplier appears, on US annual data, to be -2.7.  To the Keynesians who suggest that the concurrent correlation is horrifically negative because â?? of course â?? spending soars when the private sector is cratering, we would do well to remind them that the private spending does *not* subsequently recover.  The multiplier in the following year is -0.3, and again the year after that.

Chart 1: Real GDP, Structural GDP and Private Sector GDP, Per Capita, 1944-2011

Chart 2: US Federal Outlays and Private Sector Growth, 1953-2010

Chart 3: The Link Between Spending and Private Sector Growth, 1953-2010

It also bears mention that, because of deficit spending, the current government share of â??investment,â? in the GDP definition of the term is starkly negative, no matter what the stimulus advocates may claim!

In short, we urgently need austerity in the developed world.  Sensibly managed, austerity need not cause more than a minor and temporary dislocation, while the private sector figures out what to do with millions of government employees, doing work that is, in all too many cases, producing nothing productive.

John Bassett 34620

March 4, 2012, 2:50 p.m.

You mentioned in passing that the collection rate in Greece is poor to say the least.  What is Greece/EU doing about this?  Without compliance on paying taxes, austerity will not work.


John Basssett

Nick Proferes

March 3, 2012, 11:04 p.m.

Interesting strategy for Greece.  But I wonder if it would really work in practice?  Remember what is at the root of all their troubles, corruption in government, even to the point of lying about their economy in order to get into the EU, and tax evasion which the Greeks have raised to an art form.  To do as you suggest, there would need to be a universal change in mindset.  We’ve already seen much hardship over the past 5 years or so, and they are facing worse, but so far, I don’t see many jumping up and saying “we all need to start paying our taxes and stop dealing in cash under the counter”.

Gordon Foreman

March 3, 2012, 9:25 p.m.

So you mentioned in passing the declaration that Greece is not technically in default, and the possible unintended consequences. It appears to me that this destroys the entire foundation of the VAR (Value at Risk) model upon which the entire structure of modern finance is built.

Financial institutions take on a risk, and then buy CDOs to insure against the risk being realized, and when the risk and the insurance balance, they declare that the risk is hedged. If the CDOs are now being declared not applicable according to the whims of the supervisory body. then who can say what is at risk or not?

The leverage which was thought to be safe, suddenly looks very precarious, and if this hole is not patched very quickly and thoroughly (don’t ask me how), then I would look for institutions to start to move very quickly to reduce their exposure to said risks. But any sudden move of this sort could bring on the very collapse they they are trying to avoid, or get out ahead of.

I would guess that the risk officers of major financial institutions are putting in a long and intense weekend, and the next few weeks or days may be interesting.