America Turns 250. Yet The Data Isn't Celebrating
"Violent revolutions do not so much redistribute wealth as destroy it... The only real revolution is in the enlightenment of the mind and the improvement of character."
— Will Durant, The Lessons of History
For roughly three decades after World War II, worker pay rose almost one-for-one with productivity. As the economy grew, so did wages. That allowed a single income to buy a house, two cars, and take the family on vacation every year. Then, around 1979, it stopped.
Productivity kept climbing, rising nearly 60% over the next forty years. But wages didn't follow. They rose just 13.7% over the same stretch, adjusted for inflation.
That's what Peter Turchin asked about in his America's 250th birthday post on Substack. Turchin is a complexity scientist who runs quantitative models on thousands of years of political and economic history, the same models that led him to a concept called elite overproduction, which we'll get to shortly.
His question for America at 250, and the question we're going to look at today, is this: could a growing economy still mean a growing paycheck?
Look at this chart from the Economic Policy Institute.

From 1948 to 1979, productivity and worker pay moved almost in lockstep. Productivity grew 118.4%, compensation grew 107.5%.
Then the lines split: from 1979 to 2019, productivity grew another 59.7%, compensation just 13.7%.
Critics will rightly say that this measure is somewhat misleading. For example, machinery and automation propel productivity, and they come at a cost.
Economists like the late Martin Feldstein at Harvard and Robert Lawrence at AEI believe that once you count employer-paid health insurance and retirement contributions as compensation, use one consistent inflation measure instead of two, and look at total compensation instead of take-home wages, most of the "GDP up, paychecks flat" story disappears.
While their take is worth considering, it also proves the point another way. The share of compensation received as spendable cash has shrunk relative to the share accruing to a benefits statement.
Call it a measurement dispute or call it a distribution problem, either way, it explains why a family that's "doing fine" on paper doesn't feel like they are.
If wages really fell behind the cost of living, it wouldn't just show up in one abstract ratio. It would show up everywhere people spend money: healthcare, housing and education.
Here’s the thing. It does.
In healthcare, medical spending has steadily consumed a larger share of the American economy for more than fifty years.

Over the last half century, home prices have climbed far faster than household incomes, pushing ownership further out of reach for the typical family.

But price isn't the whole story. Mortgage rates matter too. Today's homes are the least affordable by price on record, yet the monthly payment burden was worse during the Volcker era.
There are two ways to measure housing, and they lead to different conclusions.
By price alone, 2024 is the worst on record, a home now costs 4.9 times median household income, higher than even the 2005 bubble peak. By monthly payment as a share of income, 2024 is bad but not the worst ever, 31%, worse than 2005, but still better than 1981's 47%, when Volcker-era rates alone ate up nearly half a typical paycheck.

Regardless, housing has gotten harder to afford, not easier.
Education? Same story. Public college tuition didn't merely outrun inflation, it left both inflation and wage growth far behind, fundamentally changing the economics of earning a degree.

As for retirement contributions, according to the NBER, in 1979 nearly 45% of the US work force was covered by an employer-funded pension, though roughly half were not vested. Pensions provided a guaranteed payment in retirement, for life. Today, pensions have largely been replaced by 401k and other defined contribution plans.
With each of these examples, there is nuance. Statistics can be found to support almost any argument you want to make. Plausible cases can be made that inflation is or isn’t high, that wages have or have not kept up with inflation, that today is or isn’t “harder” on the average American than it was in the (pick your decade).
Again, I go back to Dr. Turchin’s work, looking not just at the past several decades, but at 250 years.
Turchin’s Multi-Century View
Turchin asks: how much of the economy's growing output made it into the paycheck of the typical worker?

For 250 years, Turchin tracked a "relative wage": worker wages measured against GDP per capita. That ratio moves in two long cycles: up through the early republic until about 1830, down for eighty years after, up again from the New Deal through the postwar decades.
And now, by his research, down again.
In Turchin's read of the antebellum U.S., the problem wasn't just money at the top, it was too many people with elite credentials chasing too few offices. Between roughly 1830 and 1860, the ranks of lawyers and would-be officeholders grew faster than the system's ability to absorb them. Too many ambitious men, not enough Senate seats and judgeships. In his story, that surplus helps turn routine conflict into open violence: episodes like the caning of a U.S. senator on the Senate floor in 1856 are symptoms of that pressure, not outliers.
The downswing after that, the Gilded Age, was defused through reform: labor law, antitrust enforcement, the New Deal. The downswing before it wasn't defused. It became the Civil War.
In Turchin's research, a rising glut of elites and a shrinking middle class aren't two separate problems. They're the same problem, seen from opposite ends: too many players at the top and too little stability in the middle.
The chart below layers six separate measures onto a single scale: wages, health, immigration, inequality, polarization, and instability itself.

If there's one thing you should take away from it, it's this: these six measures rarely move together. When they have, twice in 250 years, the country entered a period of real upheaval. Right now, they're moving together again.
The troughs in the chart are the good times. They land around 1820 and 1950. The peaks land around the run-up to the Civil War. Turchin's research for this chart runs through 2010, but in his own words, the disintegrative trend it captures has only deepened since, in a country he now calls "extremely fragile."
Turchin isn't predicting a repeat of the 1860s. Neither am I. I'm simply asking us to consider whether his research, falling relative wages, rising inequality, more division, means something larger is upon us.
The point of all of this is to better understand what we are living through and from there, perhaps have some influence. We are heading into what looks to be an interesting election season. Already New York City has elected a “Democratic Socialist” as mayor. The question becomes “why?”
I think the answer lies in the status quo. We are among the lucky ones. If we don’t willingly change something, change may find us in what could be a most unpleasant way. As Peter Turchin's research shows, we’ve seen this situation in the US before. Today is the third time in 250 years we've seen distortions this extreme. Can we find a better resolution this time? I want to believe we can.
Next week we’ll continue exploring where we are, how we got here, and possible paths for the future. While I am aware of the cyclical research of others, some of whom I consider friends, I refuse to accept their work as prophecy.
In the meantime, let me know your thoughts – reply to this note or drop a comment here.
Thanks for reading.

Ed D’Agostino
Partner & COO
Ed D’Agostino
Publisher & COO
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Relating to how the six measures are moving together, though they rarely do. I recommend learning the theory of "The Fourth Turning" by Strauss and Howe. The book was published around 1998. I first read it in the mid 2000's. It has influenced my investment strategy ever since. You can find multiple summaries on YouTube from a few minutes to an hour in length.
Has anyone reading this thread owned a business and needed to hire intelligent workers? I may be alone with my opinion, but 1979 is also the year the Department of Education was established. Perhaps the subsequent decline in our education system forced employers to seek technology to increase productivity instead of blue collar worker ingenuity
Thank you. As per your conclusions, no simple answers stand out and I certainly profer none. But the feeling of the election cycle before us and the hope for new and successful ideas for solutions is there - solutions that recognize change and move positively forward.
Wasn't 1980 about when the offshoring, aka hollowing out of America, really took off? How many comparatively well paid, often unionized, garment or textile or furniture makers in the 1980s became barely-above-minimum-wage workers? Perhaps the corporation which had employed them prospered using foreign labor and contributed more to GDP but their wage portion of "productivity" declined. That would suggest that the improved USA productivity is an illusion, at least in part.
Housing in Western nations is expensive due to idiotic central bank policies; all central banks think the same and do the same; think bubbles and undermining the true cost of borrowing.
Increased regulatory meddling in just about everything doesn’t protect consumers; it merely creates a larger empire for left wing apparatchiks to rule over but it makes the ultimate product more expensive for those very same consumers.
Modern governments, obsessed with rights and equality, the results of ever more laws, regulations and ‘obligations’, don’t understand the simplicity of incentivising sensible behaviour and disincentivising foolish behaviour. No society will thrive if governments don’t understand wealth creation, yet concentrate on wealth redistribution.
In my humble opinion, these few sentences explain 95% of why we are, where we are.
I find that the Mauldin group, collaborators and readers are intelligent and insightful. Yet, I must take issue with part of this presentation. I'm specifically speaking of the often rolled out graph of productivity versus wages. The emotional implication is that labor isn't getting its just reward. The data is factual, but the implied conclusion is a gross misrepresentation. Productivity as a calculation is simply GDP divided by hours of labor worked. For most of historical time there was no subsititute for labor in production. Thus, increases in GDP were strictly related to better labor skill. Once there were significant tools to make the labor imput more effective, there was another factor responsible for the greater production and productivity gain. While the lines of the chart are intertwined up to about 1980, it shows that tools were an enhancement of labor not a mass replacement. The separation of the lines in the chart logically correspond to the advent of much better tools that either made for more production with less labor, or eliminated elements of the labor needed. When we recognize that the businesspersons raised and used capital to buy the machine, computer, or robot to increase production, who then owns the productivity gain? The businessperson may even expend additional capital to train the labor to use the tool more effectively, and even pay higher wages for that skill. But it's the significant advance of tools relative to wages that makes the machine more cost effective than some labor. Even better tools means less labor input to production. So, what is labor's claim on that productivity gain?????? I don't mean to devalue the actual contribution of labor, but just to recognize that the emotional argument using this graph that labor isn't getting its just reward is not true. The gap on the graph will continue to expand greatly with AI and any other advancement of tools to aid productivity. The graph will still continue to get rolled out to imply the same old message to support a false narrative, but if won't change things. The businessperson will employ whichever element costs less to create additional production, labor or machine. And any mandated increase in the cost of using labor enables more cost effective machine solutions. If you follow the math, the higher wages are pushed, the greater the use of machines as a lower cost substitute, the lesser labor hours are used, creating a greater productivity measurement. I'm sure labor will roll that one out to claim the use of higher wage labor is actually responsible for greater productivity.
Now all of this does not settle the social implications of wealth disparity. That becomes much more complicated. I only mean to dispell a misleading inference.
My last comment on labor wage implications is in the end it, like everything else, is determined by supply and demand. When we try to deny it is when distortions arise. And the distortions tend to lead to other distortions. Unwinding is difficult.
I find it very interesting that as I talk with family, friends, and business associates, everyone senses that something fundamental is changing. People feel the conflict, the uncertainty, and that we are at a major turning point. Almost no one disputes that.
Over the past few months, I've started asking a simple question: "How would you fix things?" The answers have revealed two consistent patterns.
First, most people instinctively reach for yesterday's solutions. They want to fix today's problems with the same processes, institutions, policies, and ways of thinking that created many of them. We just need to try harder, elect different leaders, spend more here, cut spending there, or make small adjustments around the edges. There is very little imagination for entirely new approaches built around innovation, new technologies, and new ways of organizing society. People naturally cling to what they know because change is uncomfortable. I think much of this is because people don't instinctively search for better ways of doing things. Instead, they rely on what they've been taught, what they've experienced, and the mental models that have served them in the past. Those frameworks can be incredibly valuable, but they can also become blinders when the world changes faster than our thinking.
Second, people generally don't want to sacrifice. They'll support solutions—as long as those solutions don't cost them anything personally. I see this most often among older generations and those in the top 10% of income and wealth. They succeeded under the existing system, so it's understandable that they want to preserve it.
Based on these conversations, I think we're going to need considerably more pain before people abandon legacy thinking and become willing to embrace meaningful change. I wish that weren't true, but history suggests America rarely changes course through logic alone. More often, it takes a shock (or shocks) powerful enough that the old way is no longer an option. I also believe we are at the dawn of an extraordinary economic supercycle for the United States that could extend through the rest of this century. But first, we'll have to endure the birthing pains that accompany this transformation.
As my father told me at the end of his career at Woolworth’s in the 1960s, yesteryear’s Walmart, beware finance people, they ruin everything when they take over a business. Why? Their business is making money not producing the best goods or services which is what made the company successful and profitable in the first place. Today we call it financialization.
Ed, interesting thoughts. Since WWII, first time homes have moved from 900-1200 sq ft to over 2000 (affordability problem or house size problem?). Second, the US has moved from a manufacturing base (pre 1980) to a service economy which "normally" have lower paychecks. Living standards are better today than 40 years ago - air conditioning (ask Europe), internet (lots of free to consumer stuff), cars last longer and better gas mileage, healthcare advances in implants, medications and treatments and many other areas. You did not mention the impacts that the govt has had on prices - just corporations. Healthcare inflation since 1965 is higher than average. College since the Dept of Education in 1979 is higher than other sectors. The regulatory impact is now costing household thousands of dollars a year (some regulations are needed, all of them?) Where is inflation lower? things where there is little govt interference - computers / technology, cars, agriculture, energy (outside wind / solar) etc. You mentioned healthcare insurance premiums and retirement plan contributions / total payroll - not take home pay. Sorry, I do not buy your argument here. Thank you.
Well put, Ed.
There's a lot to be lauded with capitalism, but as the cronyism only seems to gets worse with time, its ability to generate positive outcomes for the majority becomes increasingly limited.
I don't look at the rise of the DSA as a sincere desire for socialism/communism, as much as a rejection of this bastardized form of capitalism that's evolved over the past few decades + frustration with the staggering rise in wealth inequality. The American Dream is being replaced by 'the rich get richer', and putting our heads in the sand while waxing poetic about a form of capitalism that hasn't existed in decades is a strategy that won't get us anywhere.
Frankly I just appreciate someone of your generation being able to say the word 'socialism' without having a mental breakdown 😁