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The Nvidia Story: Three Assessments Intersected

The Nvidia Story: Three Assessments Intersected

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Let’s pick up where we ended last week, when the details about Jensen Huang’s affairs and his subsequent ousting at Nvidia were just coming out.

 

Considering all that has happened in the intervening days, we need to go much deeper. This is one of the most important geopolitical developments of this year—and if it leads to a material and imminent worsening in US-China relations, one could make the argument that it is the most important development of the year.



THE SITUATION

 

Jensen Huang’s travails intersect three major geopolitical assessments I hold.

 

The first, which has received fair pushback from readers, is the long-term rivalry that is emerging between sovereign states and powerful tech companies. I argue that the Mag 7 and other tech companies that shape our daily lives are fundamentally expressions of a unipolar world. The worldview of these companies is ’90s-esque in their unbridled optimism and self-confidence in their mission. They see themselves as transcending politics because, in the ’90s, politics had been transcended. Communism lost, liberal democracy won, so let’s beat our missiles into iPhones and make memes.

 

The second is that the US-China relationship is on a trajectory of eventual conflict. If there is any bias in my work, it is that I think an eventual war between the US and China would be very bad for the world, for the US, and for China. I hope it doesn’t come to that. Hope isn’t analysis, however, and Washington and Beijing have fundamentally incoherent geopolitical imperatives. The US seeks to maintain its global primacy. China is not willing to kowtow and believes, at minimum, it should enjoy regional primacy. Yes, the US and Chinese economies are deeply interconnected. So were European economies on the eve of World War I. Graham Allison studied 16 historical cases of a rising power threatening to displace an established one; 12 ended in war.

 

The third is that the next two years will be relatively stable in US-China relations. Say what you will about President Donald Trump; he does not accept that the US and China should be rivals. He has worked hard to forge a constructive relationship with Chinese President Xi Jinping. I have gone so far as to tell my clients to enjoy the next two years as the most stable in the US-China relationship we’ll see in the next 10.

 

The Nvidia story is a powerful confirmatory signal for assessments one and two. It is profoundly contradictory for the third.

 

1. The Jack Ma Parallel

 

What is happening to Jensen Huang and Nvidia is not much different than what happened to Chinese tech mogul Jack Ma and Alibaba back in 2020.

 

In October 2020, on the eve of an IPO for his fintech company Ant Group, Jack Ma went on stage in Shanghai and sharply criticized China’s banking system and government. Within two weeks, he’d been summoned for “regulatory talks” and his IPO was suspended. Months later, the Chinese government called China’s major tech companies’ leaders into a single room and told them essentially that unless they wanted to have the Jack Ma experience, they would do as the CPC—and specifically as Xi Jinping—said. China subsequently acquired shares with board seats in some of these companies, including Alibaba, and told them where they’d be allowed to sell, emphasizing the Chinese domestic market as their “mainstay.”

 

Is this really that different than the US government acquiring shares in companies it deems critical to its national security? In August 2025, Nvidia and AMD agreed to pay the US government 15% of their revenue from Chinese sales of H20 AI chips and MI308 chips in exchange for export licenses. Jensen Huang is in trouble in part because he did not want to abide by US export controls (i.e., restrictions on where Nvidia would be allowed to sell its products). The only real difference is that in China, Jack Ma and others got on the wrong side of Xi Jinping; in the US, Jensen assumed a good relationship with President Trump would protect him. It did until the midterms, but now President Trump is weak, and the sharks smell blood in the water.

 

This is the beginning of a US government crackdown on tech. The state, to paraphrase Max Weber, is the monopoly on the legitimate use of force within given borders. The White House controls the men with guns. The men with data, capital, and technology possess extraordinary powers, but they must bend to the will of the men with guns.

 

2. The Next Boogeyman

 

The US has always needed boogeymen to define itself against—the British, the “Yellow Peril,” Japan, Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union. China is the next country on this list. It is also the first time in US history that its chosen rival is bigger. China lacks many things, to be sure. It cannot feed its own population, and it has grown dependent on energy imports. But at a very simple level, China has more people than the US. Neither the Soviet Union nor the combined forces of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan could compete with the US on a demographic level.

 

They also could not compete with US manufacturing prowess. The US produced more merchant shipping tonnage in a single year than Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan produced in all of World War II combined. China is the world’s factory now; it accounts for 28–35% of global manufacturing output depending on your definition, and without Chinese rare earths and magnets and other components, the US economy will not work. The US is actively derisking its dependence on China, but this is a process that will take several years, if not decades. And the inconvenient truth is that today, the US is no less dependent on Chinese manufacturing than China is on access to Western markets and capital. This dependence only deepens US paranoia and drives it to manipulate markets away from China.

 

For most of its long history, China was content to be a dominant economic power within its own sphere of influence. But the growth of the Chinese population and the globalization of supply chains means that China is now dependent on trade and global supply chains. This is not your ancestors’ Middle Kingdom. This is a modern industrial state that must build a blue-water navy to defend its supply lines from enemies, whether pirates or US destroyers. In other words, China cannot defend its national security without creating the kind of military capabilities that Washington will interpret as a direct threat to its own primacy.

 

At a certain point, it is academic to argue whether China intends to pursue expansionist aims. Unless the CPC implodes (possible, if unlikely), the US and China will increasingly compete with and be suspicious of each other.

 

3. The Next Two Years

 

For all his talk of Make America Great Again, President Trump does not hold a fundamentalist belief in American primacy. President Trump has openly called the US-China relationship “the G2.” He sees China as a peer power with which he can make a deal. All his tariffs and machismo and posturing is about creating leverage to make a deal with China—not to fight China or assert US primacy.

 

Elements of President Trump’s own cabinet are not with him on this. Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Marco Rubio is a well-known China hawk and likely the source of the Jensen leaks. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has openly criticized Nvidia and China policy.

 

Moreover, being anti-China is one of the few true bipartisan positions left, and the Democrats seem to be relishing the Nvidia scandal for generating opportunities for hearings, aka political theater.

 

All of which leads me to the conclusion that my optimism about the next two years in the US-China relationship is broken. So far, what we’ve seen after the midterms:

 

  • Stephen Miller (as hardline a cabinet official as there is on China) elevated to Chief of Staff

  • Marco Rubio and Scott Bessent effectively kneecapping Trump’s friend Jensen Huang and his company Nvidia without so much as a peep from the president

  • In recent weeks, a steady drumbeat of quotes from officials like Bessent and US Trade Rep Jamieson Greer on China not living up to its prior trade and economic commitments.

 

We’ll see if President Trump is able to right things in his upcoming meeting with Xi—if he uses these developments to extract more concessions as part of his dealmaking tactics, or if he uses the China cudgel to his own benefit to buttress his abysmally low approval ratings. After all, he used anti-China invective to great effect in his first campaign back in 2015/2016. Time for some reruns.

 

Am I making a mountain out of a molehill? Perhaps we will know soon. But as George Friedman once told me, “Get excited, then get smart.” If you wait until something is obvious, you will always be behind. The only way to catch the one development in 10 that matters is to get excited about all 10, including the nine that end up not mattering. On this one, I’m excited.

 

MAP/CHART OF THE WEEK

 


BLIND SPOT

 

It has been a rough few weeks for Indonesia. The rupiah has fallen to record lows on the dollar. MSCI warned last month that the country’s emerging-market status was in jeopardy, leading to the benchmark Jakarta index tumbling ~15% (from which it still has not recovered). Last week, Vice President Gibran Rakabuming Raka—son of former President Joko Widodo (aka Jokowi)—resigned after questions about his educational credentials led to threats of impeachment.

 

Gibran’s joining the ticket with current Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto was seen as a positive note of stability in the country’s politics, but that is gone now. Prabowo is instead consolidating power, removing Jokowi allies from positions of power. Prabowo’s tenure has seen attacks on central bank independence, turmoil in the finance ministry, off-budget populist spending programs, and doubts about the governance of the country’s new sovereign wealth fund. Widespread Gen-Z/student protests erupted in August and September over inflation and governance issues but have fizzled (for now).

 

Indonesia is the fourth most populous nation in the world at ~300 million people. Its demographics are (relatively) strong. It is the world’s most populous Muslim-majority nation, and its relationship with Islam is famously moderate and pluralistic. The country sits astride critical maritime trade corridors. It contains impressive reserves of critical resources like nickel and copper, and is a major coal producer. In a multipolar world, Indonesia should be a rising power.

 

And yet the country seems determined to squander its potential. Some of this is understandable—Indonesia is a unique archipelagic nation, home to many different ethnic groups and languages. But Jokowi’s presidency seemed to be a break from the past, suggesting to optimistic observers that Indonesia might be on the cusp of transcending its differences, of utilizing its diversity as a strength rather than as something that was holding it back. But it turns out Prabowo, who has deep family ties to the authoritarian regime of Suharto and lived in self-imposed exile for years due to allegations over his role in the kidnapping and torture of pro-democracy activists, is reverting to form, attempting to centralize power rather than build coalitions.

 

READER QUESTION

 

 

 

FINALLY...

 

What I’m watching: The American Revolution, ep. 3, “The Times That Try Men’s Souls”

 

What I’m reading: Mexico: Biography of Power, Enrique Krauze

 

What I’m listening to: Symphony No. 9, Dvořák

 


P.S. No issue next Thursday. It’s Thanksgiving, and the world will keep not ending without me for a week. Back on December 3. Happy Thanksgiving!





Jacob Shapiro

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Comments (1)

JDC
49m ago

Probably the nastiest and most slanted article I've read in sometime. Thought I was reading something from Rolling Stone or Slate, not Mauldin Economics. Perhaps you should consider becoming their geopolitical analyst.

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