
Running Hot
In the last few years, we who remember the 1970’s inflation got to watch new generations learn how it feels. They haven’t enjoyed it, to say the least. I’d like to reassure them the worst is behind us. Unfortunately, I’m not sure it is.
The inflation of my youth wasn’t just a few years in the 1970s. It was an era that started in the 1960s and extended into the early 1980s. It waxed and waned within those years but gradually worsened until Paul Volcker “ended” the worst of it. The solution was quite painful, too: two recessions and high unemployment - but by that point we had run out of better options.
Now we’re roughly four years into a period of post-COVID inflationary pressure, largely the result of the Federal Reserve being too timid to slowly raise rates as inflation went over 4%. It peaked in 2022 but remains stuck above the pre-pandemic rate. I see little reason to think it will fall much from here, at least in the next few quarters – and quite a few reasons to suspect it could rise.
Let’s also note, the inflation rate is a rate, not a level. If you have a year of, say 5% inflation followed by a year of 1% inflation then yes, the inflation rate is lower. But prices are still 6% higher than they were two years earlier. They have slowed their rate of ascent but have not descended. Absent outright deflation, which has its own different but painful problems, inflation is a permanent increase in the price level.
As happened in the previous era, several forces are combining to keep inflation alive. Today I want to review what’s happening. This won’t be a fun letter to read, but it’s important. You need to prepare for what could be coming.
Third Wave
Let’s start by looking closer at the last era of inflation, in its entirety. The blue line in the chart below shows CPI inflation’s annual rates by month from 1967 to 1983. I added red arrows to highlight the three separate upward legs.

As the chart begins, inflation was quite low, just 0.75% for the year ending May 1967. By early 1970 the rate had more than tripled to 2.3% - still very low but proportionally a giant leap from where it had been. Inflation was not really a pressing topic when I was taking economics at Rice University. Many of the professors still personally remembered the Great Depression and deflation, and inflation under 2% wasn’t on their list of concerns.
This phase gave way to a two-year downtrend. Inflation improved but remained higher than before. It turned out to be a temporary break, giving way to a much worse streak from 1972-1975. Then inflation fell again before beginning the near-vertical rise that we now think of when we say, “1970s inflation.”
Notice also the gray bars, signifying recessions. Inflation accelerated during the deep and lengthy 1974-75 recession. This is what we mean by “stagflation.”
Finally, observe how bringing inflation down from the 1980 peak at just over 10% down to a “mere” 5% took two full years. Volcker did this by raising interest rates to a level that made most private borrowing practically impossible, forcibly deleveraging the economy. It was extremely painful, but he had no other options. As we’ll see below, even that option is unavailable to us now.
This next chart (from a recent report by hedge fund firm Crescat Capital) compares that earlier era with today. The red line shows core CPI inflation from 1967-1983. (My chart above looks a little different because it’s headline CPI.) The white line is core CPI from 2015 through August 2025. The overall shape is similar to that earlier era, though not quite as high.
The two initial waves are visible in both lines. If the similarity continues, a third wave is coming soon.

Is inflation pressure building again? This Torsten Slok chart shows the percentage of items in the CPI showing 3% or greater annualized price increases. It settled back from the 2022 peak but began rising again late last year.

This is a little bit misleading because the CPI items aren’t equally weighted. Some things count far more than others. Housing prices have the largest weight, and their growth rate has been falling, although slowly. The CPI shelter sub-index rose 3.6% in the last 12 months through September.
If housing keeps getting more expensive at something like that rate, and then other things that had been flat or declining turn higher too, another inflation wave becomes very likely. The question then becomes how high it will go.
Fiscal Dominance
One of this year’s little mysteries has been the way GDP keeps growing even though many consumers don’t feel it.

While GDP has flaws in its construction, which I have written about at length, it’s the best growth measure we have. It showed a good year in 2024 and, if you average Q1 and Q2, another good one in 2025 despite tariffs and other issues. Forecasters expect more growth in Q3.

Note that the Atlanta Fed estimate currently calls for exactly 4% GDP for the third quarter. The blue-chip economists consensus is over 2%, although you can find some blue-chip economists surveys that will be in the 1.5% range. So why the grumpiness?
One probable explanation: furious growth in a relatively small segment pulls up the total but its benefits stay mostly within that segment.
That is exactly what’s happening with the AI boom. Everyone hears about it, but the tangible, perceptible gains are concentrated in a small slice of the population – technology investors, data center developers and workers, and white-collar professionals who are using the systems to be more productive. Most people aren’t feeling it, except for the higher consumer prices that often trace back to the smaller group’s rising demand.
The Crescat report I cited above – which is well worth reading, by the way – talks about an age of “Spenders vs. Earners.” In the AI race we have a handful of giant companies spending vast sums on chips and infrastructure. Their spending goes to a different group of “earners” like energy, industrial, utilities and materials firms.
Yet there’s another big spender: the US government. Its spending is (for now) directed not toward AI infrastructure but to defense, public works, healthcare, and assorted entitlement programs. This money flows through the economy and sustains large parts of it. And $2 trillion of it is borrowed money, which introduces a whole new dynamic.
That $2 trillion represents roughly 7% of GDP. It is a stimulus just as much as quantitative easing would be.
This is why the Federal Reserve and the Trump administration are so at odds. Each is responding to different incentives. Jerome Powell wants to control inflation and avoid going down in history as another Arthur Burns. Donald Trump wants to keep voters happy, so he needs to sustain the programs people want without further exploding the debt. He thinks lower interest rates would help. So far the 150 basis points of interest rate cuts have really not produced all that much in terms of lower rates on mortgages and other consumer debt.
This is called “fiscal dominance,” a situation where monetary policy is directed toward helping the government pay its bills. Crescat outlines how this might look. (Emphasis mine. Read the second paragraph three times.)
“One could argue that both sides have a case. Powell is right to worry about inflation, while Trump has reason to seek relief from soaring interest costs.
“However, the reality is that fiscal dominance is becoming unavoidable. The US is approaching a point where rate suppression will be the only option, even if it means tolerating higher inflation.
“Even without interest payments, the US is still running a deficit of around 4% of GDP — an extraordinary imbalance. Cutting rates may buy time, but unless spending is reined in, the fiscal math only gets worse. Mandatory outlays are difficult to reduce without radical reform, so the adjustment is likely to come at the expense of growth-oriented initiatives.

